INTRODUCTION
Where is the practice of medicine and public health in China heading, what are the implications of present changes for the future, and what does all this mean for foreign scientists and practitioners who desire to build a closer relationship with counterparts in the Middle Kingdom? At the risk of some overstatement, a change in the ethical base of the Chinese revolution now is occurring. This change is affecting the distribution of health care and it is altering the standards guiding the development of medicine in China. For Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), the equal distribution of basic medical services was the standard by which medicine and public health should be judged. He believed that peasants, by virtue of their rural location, should not be disadvantaged in receiving basic medical care. Because of the paucity of medical resources and their prior concentration in the cities, Mao's Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) value of equality translated into a requirement that manpower and money be redistributed. Finances and human resources were diverted toward rural areas and away from the cities and basic research.
In the wake of the Chairman's 1976 demise, different goals and values have come to grip China: modernization and economic growth. Now, medicine is judged not strictly by the egalitarian standard but by the degree to which medical science is, itself, "modern" and by the degree to which it facilitates economic expansion. Health services are now to be disproportionately available to those who contribute most to modernization. conditions in most cities are still not quite ideal. In some cities, they are no better than in the 1950s" [3] . Politically, the reforms generated opposition among professionals, Party cadres decried the decline in services available to them, and urbanites were displeased with deteriorating services too. All this, we're now told, hurt productivity, innovation, and growth.
With these problems in mind, Mao's successors have systematically begun to alter medical policy along a broad front, though Mao's imprint remains. During 1979, China's medical leadership unveiled plans to modernize one-third of China's county hospitals by 1985. To this end, the Draft State Budget for 1979 called for the construction of 80,000 hospital beds in 1979 alone, almost as many hospital beds as there were throughout China in 1949 [4] . Beijing (Peking) not only is utilizing domestic resources to finance hospital construction, it also is looking abroad. In October 1979, China was reported to have formally asked the Japanese for capital assistance in building a 1,000-bed hospital [5] . Similarly, the well-known Chinese surgeon Huang Jiasi recently visited America in search of philanthropic support for the construction of centers of medical excellence.
This renewed emphasis upon hospital care has required changes in medical education. While physicians with three years' academic medical training may have been appropriate for delivering basic medical care in the villages or county hospitals, such abbreviated training is now viewed as inadequate to meet the needs of urban medical facilities. Older doctors trained in the 1940s and 1950s now frequently speak of doctors trained during the Cultural Revolution with barely disguised derision. In order to begin producing medical personnel who are seen as appropriate, medical schools have lengthened their curricula to five years, with opportunities for postgraduate specialty training being provided for the first time in well over a decade. Conversely, barefoot doctors, much acclaimed during and after the Cultural Revolution, are now openly admonished to improve their skills. Too, there are indications that there has been a reduction in the number of these paramedic personnel [6] .
The trend toward hospital construction and longer medical education has brought in its wake a renewed concern for advanced biomedical research and sophisticated clinical procedures. For instance, organ transplants (heart and kidney) are now being undertaken, and in 1978 a much publicized conference on artificial hearts was convened. The trend toward basic research is also evident if one looks at budgetary expenditures. The Draft State Budget for 1979 called for an increase of some 10 percent in expenditures for"science" over the year before. The entire budget line item "culture, education, health work and science" was slated to increase only 7.2 percent during the same period [7] . Concisely, China is determined to "modernize," with modernization meaning urban, high-technology, and hospital-based medical delivery built upon a foundation of basic biomedical research.
The trends described above must be placed in two important contexts: First, changes in Chinese policy rhetoric frequently are more dramatic than the actual changes which ultimately result. If change is not billed as "revolutionary" it seems difficult to convince the geological layers of Chinese bureaucracy to take it seriously. While there has been a relative (and important) shift in emphasis, the rural areas are not being abandoned. Instead, there is a shift in priorities and, over the long run, this shift will bring gains to some social sectors and losses to others. Doubtless, too, some Chinese would argue that improving the urban medical system is in the long-term interests of the peasantry.
Second, present health policy must be viewed in conjunction with the elite's broader economic and political objectives. Mao's successors have now defined economic growth and "modernization" as their principal goals. To [8] .
Population Policy
Ironically, the regime's widespread provision of basic public health and curative services, in the context of three decades of relative civil calm, has contributed to an enormous problem-China has an extremely large population with a great percentage of the citizenry just entering its prime childbearing years. According to Chinese statistics, the national mortality rate is down from 28 per thousand population in the immediate pre-1949 period to about 6-7 per thousand in 1979 [9] . Throughout the 1949-1979 period, the natural growth rate of the population averaged approximately 2 percent-a doubling time of 35 years. China's population is currently growing at about 1.2 percent per annum [10] . A note of alarm recently has crept into the elite's discussion of the population. Presently, every woman of childbearing age has an average of 2.3 children during her reproductive life [11] . Were this rate to persist, by the year 2000 China's population would be about 1.282 billion persons. This would jeopardize capital accumulation and, in the end, the modernization effort itself.
China's population is bigger than in the past and the number of women of child-bearing age is also greater. Unless population growth is brought under control, the future birth rate will be much higher than in the past two or three decades. What is more, most of those born from now on will be dependents by the end of this century, using up large quantities of social wealth and affecting accumulation of capital [12] .
Prior to his death, Chairman Mao's populist belief that people are solutions, not problems, inhibited Beijing's leaders from initiating a stringent population program; the present elite has few such compunctions. In spring 1979, individual provinces began to issue regulations on family size, regulations which differed in detail but were similar in intent and method. Anhui Province, for instance, promulgated tough regulations with "rewards" and "'sanctions" clearly spelled out. Couples who had only one child (and were carrying out "effective birth control methods to insure that they will not have a second") were to receive priority in obtaining schooling and medical care for their child, were to be given the same housing floorspace as though they had two children and, in rural areas, an only child was to receive an adult grain ration [ 13] . Sanctions against three-child families (or two-child families previously rewarded for having only one child) were to include: denial of additional ration coupons (except for cloth) for the third child, denial of extra floorspace beyond that provided two-child families, and no private plot space was to be provided the third child. Finally, "couples who undergo sterilization operations and medical personnel who have done well in performing such operations are to receive economic care and reward" [14] . Although Anhui's regulations are not necessarily identical to those of all other areas, Vice-Premier Chen Muhua set the tone for national policy in August 1979 when she declared, Fast population growth has hampered the four modernizations and raising the people's living standards.... People who refuse to be persuaded and insist on having more children will be taxed [15] .
In short, population growth is believed to inhibit economic expansion and those who contribute most to solving this problem will be rewarded materially. By all accounts, the rural birth rate is substantially higher than in urban areas. Consequently, the uniform application of these sorts of regulations necessarily will mean that peasants will more frequently receive sanctions than city dwellers. While one cannot assume that the intimacy of village life will prove conducive to the strict implementation of these policies, Beijing obviously is pursuing a policy which is designed to reward those who contribute to economic growth and to punish those who constitute an economic drag. These policies will impose the heaviest burdens upon the peasants (if they are applied), those persons who tend to believe that having more children is both a social and economic necessity.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESENT TRENDS FOR
SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION The trends discussed above have far-reaching implications for scientific cooperation between China and America, particularly in the biomedical field. Indeed, the June 1979 Sino-American agreement on "Cooperation in the Science and Technology of Medicine and Public Health" would have been inconceivable had China not been moving in the directions described above [16] . Just examining the topics identified as priority areas for cooperation in the agreement reveals the thrust toward professionalism and basic research. The following topics were identified as priority foci for cooperation: infectious and parasitic diseases, cancer, cardiovascular diseases, public health and health services research, medical information sciences, immunology, and medical genetics. In these fields, China offers some exciting prospects for joint collaboration and perhaps meaningful field research. The time is ripe for American scientists of vision to initiate joint research projects with Chinese colleagues. For example, one promising area for joint research deals with the environmental contributors to cancer. Because China has several regionally specific cancer types, it is possible to try to link variations in incidence to differences in local conditions [17] .
As we move into a closer cooperative relationship with the Chinese biomedical establishment, however, we would be wise to remember that the present orientation of medicine and public health in China, in the end, is a political issue; it is fragile. The shift away from Mao's doctrine of equality toward policies based upon concepts of equity will be advantageous to some groups and hurt others. It is hard to argue that the basic health needs of China's peasants will immediately benefit from massive investments in pure research-perhaps in the long run, but certainly not immediately. Consequently, by becoming intimately tied to the basic research and high-technology focus of present policy, America could in the future find itself, once again, accused of promoting policies harmful to China's less fortunate citizens.
Does this mean that we ought to hold back in our dealings with the Chinese? I think not. It does, however, suggest that American scientists, doctors, and public health workers need to try, at every opportunity, to encourage China to adopt appropriate technologies and to focus on those areas which offer the brightest prospect for meeting its citizens' basic needs. This need not lead to a rejection of advanced technology, but only to the creative and thoughtful application of that technology to problems that most Chinese citizens would concede are genuine. This is the most solid foundation upon which we can build a hopefully enduring relationship.
